Posted on July 13, 2008 by Peter Turney
I recently read an interesting paper, How Is Meaning Grounded in Dictionary Definitions? The abstract follows:
Meaning cannot be based on dictionary definitions all the way down: at some point the circularity of definitions must be broken in some way, by grounding the meanings of certain words in sensorimotor categories learned from experience or shaped by [...]
Filed under: Computational Linguistics, Philosophy of Mind, Semantics | Tagged: AI, lexicons, perception, symbols | 9 Comments »
Posted on January 19, 2008 by Peter Turney
Peter Gärdenfors proposes that there are three levels of abstraction for modeling thought:
Symbolic: logic, expert systems, Prolog, Cyc, good old-fashioned AI, theorem proving
Spatial: geometry, feature spaces, conceptual spaces, semantic spaces, information retrieval, vector space models, latent semantic analysis, machine learning
Connectionist: neural networks, Hebbian theory, associationism, perceptrons, neuroscience
These levels might be compared to modeling physics at [...]
Filed under: Computational Linguistics, Computer Science, Philosophy of Mind, Semantics | Tagged: concepts, conceptual spaces, connectionism, geometry, symbols | 11 Comments »
Posted on May 4, 2007 by Peter Turney
There is a view that the meaning of words (more generally, of symbols) must be grounded in sensory perception or in physical interaction with the world (embodiment). If symbols were merely defined in terms of other symbols, then it seems that we would have an infinite regression; we would spin in circles in symbol space, [...]
Filed under: Computational Linguistics, Philosophy of Mind, Semantics | Tagged: AI, perception, symbols, Turing test | 3 Comments »